Gendered Strategies between Democratization and Democratic Reversal: The Curious Case of Turkey by Aksoy, Hürcan Asli
Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183–2463)
2018, Volume 6, Issue 3, Pages 101–111
DOI: 10.17645/pag.v6i3.1423
Article
Gendered Strategies between Democratization and Democratic Reversal:
The Curious Case of Turkey
Hürcan Aslı Aksoy
Institute for Political Science, University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, 91054 Erlangen, Germany; E-Mail: huercan.asli.aksoy@fau.de
Submitted: 14 February 2018 | Accepted: 25 June 2018 | Published: 14 September 2018
Abstract
The processes of democratization or democratic reversal have serious implications for gender equality regimes. Although
the gender and transition literature has extensively examined the relation between democratization and gender, it only
recently began to question how the changing dynamics of democratic reversal influence gender politics and policies.While
women’s participation and representation in the formal arena of politics has been the primary object of theoretical discus-
sions, the research rediscovers the power of the informal arena. To find tentative answers to the newly developing research
agenda, this article employs the case of Turkey. To this end, the article examines the gendered strategies of four groups
of organized women (feminist, Kurdish, Islamist, and Kemalist women’s organizations) engaged in strengthening women’s
rights and gender equality. It first questions how, and to what extent, organized women engendered democratization pro-
cess and then sheds lights on the shift in their strategies to respond to the increasingly authoritarian and conservative
Islamist political agenda of the ruling Justice and Development Party. Drawing on empirical findings, the article aims to
inform the theoretical debates on the analytical relation between democratic reversals and gender rights regimes.
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1. Introduction
On 5 June 2016, at the opening of the new building of
the Kadın ve Demokrasi Derneği (KADEM) [Women and
Democracy Association], Turkish President Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan asserted that “a woman who rejects moth-
erhood, who refrains from being around the house—
however successful in her work life—is deficient, and
is incomplete” (The Guardian, 2016). He further recom-
mended that women should have at least three children,
which he frequently mentions in his public speeches.
These statementswere one of the latest in a series of con-
troversial remarks that impose conservative family val-
ues and norms on women. Erdoğan repeatedly declared
that he does not believe in equality of women and men
because they are biologically different and have differ-
ent societal roles (The Guardian, 2014). Women’s rights
advocates have claimed that Erdoğan’s remarks create a
climate in which intimidation, discrimination, and abuse
of women became normalized. The growing social con-
servatism, which is not unique to Turkey, is utilized to
legitimize the reconfiguration of the political rule under
the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) [Justice and Devel-
opment Party].
The ruling AKP, which came to power in 2002, pur-
sued a series of political and economic reforms. After a
period of a democratic progress, the AKP began “to ce-
ment its own hold on power” (Müftüler-Baç & Keyman,
2012, p. 86) and to restrict the leeway for the democratic
opposition, civil society, and the media. Turkey’s imper-
fect democracy turned into a formof “competitive author-
itarianism”1 (Esen & Gumuscu, 2016; Öniş, 2013). With
1 Levitsky and Way state that in competitive authoritarian regimes formal democratic institutions (e.g., free and fair elections, political rights and civil
liberties) are viewed as the principal means of obtaining and exercising political authority. However, incumbents violate those rules so frequently that
it creates an “uneven playing field” between government and opposition (2002, pp. 52–53).
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the rise of authoritarianism, patriarchal notions and con-
servative family values have become more salient in the
AKP’s political discourse onwomen (Acar&Altunok, 2013;
Altunok, 2016; Güneş-Ayata & Doğangün, 2017; Kandiy-
oti, 2015, 2016). The patriarchal control of gender rela-
tions leads to a perpetual conflict between the govern-
ment and women’s organizations struggling for women’s
equal rights. Thus, the article aims to examine the strate-
gies of women’s organizations in the process of democra-
tization and democratic reversal under the conservative
political agenda of the AKP. Drawing on the arguments of
“democratization from below”, the article argues that or-
ganized women play a substantial role in negotiating gen-
der issues and responding to negative changes in gender
policies in a political environment, where anti-democratic
and anti-gender sentiments are on the rise.
The article examines the strategies of organized
women in Turkey defending gender equality. Although
the concept of gender equality can have multiple mean-
ings in different political contexts (cf. Verloo, 2007), here
it refers to formal equality, in which all women and men
have similar opportunities to participate in politics, econ-
omy, and society. By employing a qualitative analysis, the
article aims to shed light on the role of organized women
in defying the conservative and authoritarian gender dis-
course and practices of the AKP. The findings on Turkey
may provide valuable insights into the newly emerging
field within the gender and politics scholarship dealing
with backsliding in gender equality in the context of de-
democratization and democratic reversal.
2. A Gendered Approach to Democratization and
Democratic Reversal
The concept of democratization encompasses two dis-
cussions: 1) how to define democracy, and 2) what are
the favoring and disfavoring conditions of a democrati-
zation process. In line with the mainstream democrati-
zation literature, the article employs a mid-range def-
inition of democracy―a procedural understanding of
democracy―that focuses on the institutions and rules of
democracy. Although the conducive factors that facilitate
democratization and the consolidation of democracy are
still disputed in democratization studies, the main con-
sensus is that the democratization process is not an ir-
reversible condition. In other words, democracies can al-
ways becomeweaker or stronger (Diamond, 1997; Linz &
Stepan, 1997). Thus, the literature deals with both direc-
tions within the process of democratization; i.e., transi-
tion to democracy and democratic reversal.
In recent years, countries around the globe experi-
enced democratic decline, and even suffered democratic
reversal. Since citizens think that governments do not
substantially represent their interests, they are tempted
either to support populist leaders with weak democratic
credentials (Ottoway, 2000), or to mobilize for a bet-
ter democracy (Diamond & Plattner, 2015). As Free-
dom House claims in its 2017 report, “the dual threat”
to democracy, i.e., rising populism and authoritarian-
ism, challenges the progress made in political rights
and civil liberties globally. This anti-democratic wave
has far-reaching consequences for women’s rights and
gender equality, too. We already witness a strength-
ening of anti-feminist politics and anti-gender move-
ments, growing online violence against women in pol-
itics, and the perennial problem of domestic violence
against women (see introduction of this issue). While
the “malestream democratization literature” (Waylen,
2007) seeks to understand reasons behind democratic re-
versals, it completely ignores the gender perspective of
the phenomenon. Gender and politics scholars thus be-
gan to investigate to what extent these anti-democratic
and anti-gender developments represent a threat to the
achievements in gender equality regimes and to gen-
der relations (e.g. this issue). But further research is
needed to examine how exactly democratic reversal af-
fects women’s rights actors both in- and outside of for-
mal politics and how they should resist and counteract
de-democratization processes.
To investigate the negative developments in gender
policies, gender and politics scholars studying more gen-
der equal societies of the West focus mostly on the for-
mal arena of politics (executive, legislative, and judiciary
bodies) in shaping the nature of institutions and pro-
cesses. Waylen, for instance, suggests changing the insti-
tutions of democracy “to promulgate democracies with
enhanced levels of participation, representation and le-
gitimacy” (2015, p. 498). To this end, scholars suggest
introducing gendered institutional mechanisms such as
gender quotas, or to strengthen state’s women’s agen-
cies in order to increase women’s participation and rep-
resentation and thereby hinder the crises in democra-
cies (e.g., Krook &Messing-Mathie, 2013;Waylen, 2015).
Nevertheless, how to resist reversal in democracies and
how to prevent backsliding in gender policies and laws re-
main to be resolved in the literature. Since trust in demo-
cratic institutions is declining, but public interest in “do-
ing politics” has been rising (Diamond & Plattner, 2015),
it is time for scholars to reconsider and re-examine the
informal arena of politics, especially civil society, which
is “an area of contesting projects” (Walby, 2011, p. 6).
The collective, autonomous, and voluntaristic character
of civil society provides women and men with the op-
portunity to voice and mobilize for their gendered de-
mands. In line with gender and politics scholars studying
developing countries with less gender equality regimes
(Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and
the Middle East), we can argue that within the civil soci-
etal space, organizedwomen not only have the chance to
monitor state’s gender policies but also to resist negative
changes and backsliding in policies and laws. Although a
great deal of the literature on social movements exam-
ines women’s organizing in civil society, its main interest
remains the aims, internal characteristics, and framing
of their demands (Waylen, 2007, p. 51). This is not suf-
ficient to examine the interaction of organized women
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with state institutions and the political context. Thus, a
thorough gendered examination of democratization and
democratic reversal needs to consider women’s agency
in the informal arena of politics, without ignoring the in-
teraction with the formal arena. To this end, the article
pays particular attention to women’s civil society orga-
nizations (CSOs) and their interaction with state institu-
tions in formulating gender policies and in rejecting anti-
feminist policies and regulations that are detrimental to
gender equality.
In this article, I will focus on four groups of women’s
organizations that reflect the dominant political cleav-
ages in Turkey: feminist, Kurdish, Islamist, and Kemal-
ist women’s CSOs. Most of the scholarly literature on
women’s organizing in Turkey refer to these four groups
and examine them, albeit to different extents (e.g., Arat,
2008; Bora&Günal, 2007; Coşar &Onbaşi, 2008; Diner &
Toktaş, 2010; Marshall, 2009). For each group, I selected
three organizations that are each highly influential and
representative within their groups, and that are not de-
pendent on political parties.2 The study deployed a qual-
itative analysis and collected the empirical data mainly
from the primary sources. First, I conducted twenty semi-
structured, in-depth interviews with the executive mem-
bers of the selected women’s CSOs and feminist aca-
demics during research trips between 2010 and 2012.
Second, in October 2016, I met academics and women’s
rights activists from different women’s groups in a re-
search workshop organized by University of Bremen.
There, I had the opportunity to discuss how women’s
groups resist the recent conservative gender politics
of the ruling AKP. Third, to supplement the data, I re-
viewed publications, public statements, and interviews
in newspapers and social media accounts of the selected
women’s CSOs. Fourth, the study profited from the grey
literature, i.e., the surveys and reports of the Ministry
of Family and Social Policies and of national and interna-
tional research institutes to identify state’s projects and
policies related to gender issues. In doing so, I applied
process tracing, and textual analysis of these data. The
evidences obtained from the state’s reports were com-
pared with the reports conducted by autonomous non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) to verify or falsify
the findings. Secondary sources, e.g., the journal articles
on gender issues and gender politics in Turkey, provided
mewith further data. In the following, first, the trajectory
of Turkish democracy will be delineated. Thereafter, or-
ganized women’s strategies will be examined in the con-
text of democratization and democratic reversal.
3. Women’s Organizing, Democratization, and
Democratic Reversal in Turkey
In democratization studies, Turkey constitutes an un-
usual case. Although the transition tomulti-party politics
had been accomplished seven decades ago, Turkey failed
to consolidate its democracy based on a pluralistic and
inclusive political order (Öniş, 2013). During these seven
decades, Turkish democracy was punctuated by numer-
ous breakdowns and restorations, which were caused
by the military’s direct or indirect interventions (1960,
1971, 1980, and 1997). In this military-dominated polit-
ical space, civil society was considered a way of resist-
ing the strong state and of incubating pluralistic society
in Turkey. As the literature on women’s movements in
Turkey acknowledges, organized feminist women were
the first group within civil society that had the courage
to challenge the military dominance and voice their de-
mands for more freedom, democracy, and gender equal-
ity (e.g., Arat, 2008; Bora & Günal, 2007; Diner & Toktaş,
2010;Marshall, 2009).3 From themid-1990s on, the pub-
lic visibility of feminists encouraged women from other
oppositional movements to mobilize around women’s
issues, especially from the Islamist and Kurdish move-
ments. Feminist organizing was important in the devel-
opment of diverse women’s movements within the illib-
eral political space, but tensions existed among differ-
ent organized women’s groups around issues of ethnic-
ity, religion, class, and the meaning of feminism (Arat,
2008; Diner & Toktaş, 2010). Despite the ideological frag-
mentation, women’s organizations proliferated and cre-
ated a range of mobilizing structures to challenge patri-
archal structures in society and politics. With the rise of
the Islamist AKP to power in 2002, Turkey entered an-
other phase in its political development. In its first term
(2002–2007), the AKP, in line with Turkey’s prospect of
being a European Union (EU) member, successfully ini-
tiated democratic reforms to strengthen political rights
and civil liberties (Aydin & Keyman, 2004; Öniş, 2013). In
this period, civil society—including organized women—
was highly active in pushing for the consolidation of
democracy in Turkey. After this remarkable democratic
progress, the AKP decelerated the democratization pro-
cess in its second term (2007–2011). The AKP leadership
began to emphasize an economically strong Turkey with
a rather minimalist understanding of democratic rights
and institutions (Öniş, 2013, p. 114). Thanks to the 2010
constitutional referendum that led to a restructuring of
the judiciary and increased civilian oversight of the mil-
itary, the AKP could further consolidate its own power
at the expense of the legislative and the judiciary power
(Esen & Gumuscu, 2016). In its third term (2011–2015),
especially after the 2013 summer protests (known also
as Gezi protests) directed against authoritarian rule of
the AKP and the coup attempt in July 2016, the govern-
ment increased political pressure on business, the oppo-
sition, and civil society and limited the leeway for inde-
pendent media. The latest political developments clearly
point to a democratic reversal. These developments in-
clude: mass arrests of opposition members and journal-
2 I do not name the selected women’s CSOs due to the limited space; see further (Aksoy, 2017).
3 It is claimed that in authoritarian regimes, where the political arena is substantially constrained, the identification of women as “apolitical” and their
activities as “not being political enough” allow women to organize their activities in civil society (Waylen, 2007, p. 56).
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ists, purges in public institutions, constraints on freedom
of assembly and association, palpable deficiencies in the
rule of law, and the disregard of the diverse segments
of civil society, except for the government supported Is-
lamist NGOs (Freedom House, 2017). With the constitu-
tional referendum in April 2017 and the re-election of
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to the presidency in June 2018,
which transformed the country from a parliamentary
into a presidential system, Turkey evolved from electoral
democracy to “competitive authoritarian regime” (Esen
& Gumuscu, 2016). Against this political background, or-
ganized women search for strategies to deal with the in-
creasingly authoritarian and ultra-conservative Islamist
politics of the AKP.
4. Gendered Strategies in Democratization and
Democratic Reversal in Turkey
During the first two terms of the AKP (2002–2007
and 2007–2011), positive changes were witnessed in
women’s rights and gender equality policies (Acar & Al-
tunok, 2013; Aksoy, 2017; Güneş-Ayata & Doğangün,
2017; Kandiyoti, 2016). The AKP introduced new laws,
regulations, andmechanisms to prevent violence and dis-
crimination against women and to strengthen women’s
rights to attain gender equality: The Labor Law reform
(2003); the Penal Code reform (2004); the reform of Ar-
ticle 14 of the Municipality Law (2005) forcing munici-
palities with more than 50.000 inhabitants to establish
women’s shelters. With the introduction of a clause (Art.
10) in the Turkish Constitution (2004), the state became
obligated to take all necessary measures to achieve gen-
der equality. In 2007 and 2012, Kadının Statüsü Genel
Müdürlüğü (KSGM) [The General Directorate on the Sta-
tus of Women], the state body responsible for women’s
affairs, launched action plans for combating violence
against women.
These gender-sensitive laws and policies were intro-
duced not only due to the EU accession processes but
also thanks to the involvement and domestic pressure
of women’s CSOs in policymaking processes (Acar & Al-
tunok, 2013; Kandiyoti, 2015). Women’s CSOs partici-
pated in most phases of policymaking: in agenda set-
ting, in decision-making, implementation, monitoring,
and even in policy evaluation. Clearly, during the first two
terms of the AKP, women’s CSOs were successful in trans-
lating their gendered claims into concrete laws and poli-
cies strengthening women rights. However, beginning
with the third termof theAKP (2011), there has been a re-
markable shift in party’s approach to gender policies. The
AKP began to strongly emphasize women’s designated
roles as “mothers” and to promote pro-natal policies (Al-
tunok, 2016; Güneş-Ayata & Doğangün, 2017; Kandiy-
oti, 2016). In such an increasing patriarchal domination
of the AKP and its authoritarian grip on power, Turkey
began to witness the dismantling of existing progres-
sive gender policies and the exclusion of autonomous
women’s CSOs from policymaking processes. Occasion-
ally, Erdoğan and the other AKP leaders attempt to pub-
licly discredit feminist activists. Instead, the AKP incor-
porates government-organized NGOs (GONGOs), focus-
ing on women’s issues, in policymaking processes to sup-
port its conservative public policies (Aksoy, 2015; Kandiy-
oti, 2015). The government sponsors these GONGOs to
represent Turkey in international women’s forums. This
helps the AKP to control civil society effectively. Against
this background, autonomous women’s CSOs seek alter-
native ways to pursue their activities. How do organized
women deal with the enforced conservative gender poli-
cies that push women to accept traditionally designed
gender roles? What strategies do they develop to resist
theAKP’s repressive politics? In the following section, I fo-
cus on the strategies of the aforementioned four groups
of women’s CSOs before and after 2011 to highlight the
shift in AKP’s gender politics that accompanied its author-
itarian turn.
4.1. Feminist Women’s CSOs
Like the second wave feminists of the 1960s and
1970s in the West, Turkish feminists―organized in the
1980s―focused on issues such as gendered inequalities,
domestic violence, sexual harassment, women’s sexual-
ity, and women’s reproductive rights (Arat, 2008; Bora
& Günal, 2007; Coşar & Onbaşi, 2008). Thanks to their
institutionalization in organizations in the 1990s, femi-
nist women were able to approach and interact with
state institutions responsible for gender policies more
easily. They pressured the governments for the removal
of discriminatory and women-unfriendly formulations
in laws (Diner & Toktaş, 2010). Moreover, using their
increased cooperation with the international women’s
networks such as the United Nations Women and the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrim-
ination against Women (CEDAW) Committee, they in-
creased their bargaining power with state institutions to
improve women’s rights. However, in the 1990s, there
was not much alliance and coalition-building between
feminist CSOs and other organized women’s groups.
4.1.1. Engendering the Democratization before 2011
In the beginning of the 2000s, the Turkish laws relating
to women rights had to be adapted to EU law. Feminist
CSOs thus gained an important opportunity for advanc-
ing women’s rights. They were highly active and influen-
tial in the amendment processes of the Civil and the Pe-
nal Code (Arat, 2008; Kandiyoti, 2015; Marshall, 2009).
While the new Civil Code (2002) guaranteed equality
between men and women within the family unit, the
Penal Code revision was a major step in criminalizing
violence against women. However, policymakers and
feminist CSOs ran into several controversies. In 2004,
the then prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made a
last-minute interference in the Penal Code reform pro-
cess pushing for the criminalization of adultery. Femi-
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nist CSOs used the following strategies to counteract this
proposal: 1) mobilizing women through demonstration
and a nation-wide petition, 2) reaching out for support
from women’s international networks and the EU insti-
tutions, and 3) attracting the Turkish media’s attention.
In response to the domestic and international pressures,
the AKP retracted the proposal on criminalizing adultery.
Reforming the Civil and Penal Code was not only a major
step in strengthening women’s rights, but also enhanced
women’s substantive representation; i.e., the expression
of women’s interests in policies and institutions.
In 2004, feminist CSOs lobbied key parliamentari-
ans to have the gender equality clause enshrined in
the Turkish Constitution. The article in question (Arti-
cle 10) stipulates: “women and men have equal rights.
The State is responsible for taking all measures to real-
ize gender equality” (Amend 7.5.2004–5170, Clause 1).
Another encounter was in 2011, when feminists pushed
for the revision of the existing Law on the Protection
of the Family (No 4320). The Ministry of Family and
Social Policies included representatives of Şiddete Son
Platformu [Stop Violence Platform]—consisting of 241
women’s organizations—in the policymaking process.
Feminist CSOs formed nationwide networks, established
web-based blogs to inform the Turkish public on the new
Protection Law (No 6284) and continued to lobby par-
liamentarians sympathetic to feminist demands. One of
my interviewees,whowas active in the policymaking pro-
cess, stated that:
During the process of amending the Protection Law,
we have been screening the draft proposal and ad-
dressing the problematic formulations such as exclud-
ing “non-married women” from the protection law.
The Minister (for Family and Social Policies) Fatma
Şahin and her officials were mostly responsive to our
demands, but they were feeling the pressure of the
conservative basis of the party (AKP).4
The new Law to Protect Family and Prevent Violence
against Women (No 6284), which was amended on
8 March 2012, increased the sentences for violence
against women and developed state-led central mecha-
nisms to prevent violence against women and children.
In addition to organizing issue-specific campaigns and
lobbying activities for achieving gender equality, fem-
inist CSOs continued their activities to raise women’s
awareness of their legal rights. In addition, they prepared
shadow reports, which are produced bywomen’s CSOs in
the countries that signed the CEDAWagreement, to high-
light discriminatory provisions in the legal framework
and call for immediate actions. This is a way to create ex-
ternal pressure on the ruling AKP. In this period, feminist
CSOs played an important role in policymaking processes
pertaining to women’s rights.
4.1.2. In the Shadow of Authoritarianism after 2011
After 2011, when the process of democratic rever-
sal began, organized feminists pointed out the con-
nections between the rising authoritarianism and
“religio-conservative” (Güneş-Ayata & Doğangün, 2017)
practices of the AKP. Feminist activists and scholars
alike stressed that Erdoğan’s recurrent statements on
women’s roles as “mothers” constitute the central axis
of the party’s populist and authoritarian rhetoric and pol-
itics (Acar & Altunok, 2013; Güneş-Ayata & Doğangün,
2017; Kandiyoti, 2016). To resist the AKP’s conservative
policy proposals, feminist CSOs began to form large in-
formal women’s platforms bringing together many orga-
nizations from different women’s groups. Kadın Cinayet-
lerini Durduracağız Platformu (We Will Stop Femicide
Platform), for instance, can exert considerable influence
on the public agenda regarding gender-based violence.
This Platform helps to not only attract the public’s atten-
tion, but it also pushes judges and state prosecutors to
enforce laws correctly by following the court cases per-
taining to violence against women. Different from the
short-lived and issue-oriented national women’s coali-
tions they built before 2011, when the AKP was respon-
sive to the demands of women’s rights advocates, femi-
nist CSOs nowprefer to build large and informalwomen’s
platforms to prevent backsliding in gender policies dur-
ing the democratic reversal.
In 2013, for instance, Erdoğan commenced a public
debate on abortion, although women have legally been
able to have abortions since 1983. Erdoğan stressed that
abortion is not an issue of women’s bodily rights, but
rather it is the right of the embryo to be born. Similar
to women’s protests in Poland, feminist CSOs immedi-
ately initiated a campaign called “Abortion is a Right”
through social media. They reached an international au-
dience and organized sit-in demonstrations in different
cities to oppose the newly planned laws on birth con-
trol and abortion (Letsch, 2013). Feminist, Kurdish, and
Kemalist women’s groups, along with members of the
Turkish Doctors Union, criticized the AKP’s attempt to
outlaw abortion through several press releases. The AKP
thus withdrew its draft proposal due to the domestic and
international reactions; however, public hospitals have
been rejecting women’s request for abortions with de
facto state decrees (Yüncüler, 2014).
One of the latest attacks of the conservative AKP
politicians was the law proposal that has been labelled
the “rape law” (November 2016). The law proposal
meant to grant amnesty to persons charged with child
sexual assault, if they marry their victims, and the act
was committed “without force, threat, trick or any other
restriction of consent” (Cupolo, 2016). This proposal
caused a public outcry and triggered nationwide protests
and the Twitter campaign (#tecavüz-rape) of women’s
platforms, inwhich feminist CSOswere highly visible. The
AKP officials rejected the criticism and claimed that this
4 Personal interview, February 2012, Istanbul.
Politics and Governance, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 3, Pages 101–111 105
law aimed at helping couples who fell afoul of the law
“because they had underage, but consensual sex and
wanted to marry” (Tremblay, 2016). The parliamentary
opposition criticized the bill and rejected it in the second
round of voting. Thus, the AKP government was forced
to withdraw the bill.
Put together, to resist the AKP’s increasing hostility
towards feminist demands, organized feminists, like their
counterparts around the world (e.g. women’s marches),
prefer to go onto the streets to protest and make
their claims visible. Similar to feminists in Latin Amer-
ica (Chile, Argentina and Brazil under military authori-
tarian regimes), they employ a two-level-strategy. First,
on the national level, they conduct their advocacy ef-
forts through large women’s coalitions that are not short-
term and issue-specific as it was in the 1990s and the
2000s. Second, on the international level, the feminist
CSOs continuously inform international women’s net-
works on backsliding in gender policies to create ex-
ternal pressure on the AKP. They extensively use so-
cial media to mobilize women for defending women’s
rights, like the virally spread #MeToo campaign.5 Femi-
nist groups shifted their pro-active strategy to influence
gender issues into a defensive one. As one feminist ac-
tivist claimed in our interview:
We [feminists] used to reach the parliamentary
commissions and parliamentarians easily and could
influence decision-making processes in advancing
women’s rights. But nowadays, Erdoğan and the AKP
politicians ignore our demands, marginalize and hu-
miliate us in their public speeches. Erdoğan repeats
his religious and sexist views onwomen and demands
from his people [ministers] legal changes accordingly.
In this atmosphere, our struggle only focuses on pre-
venting the regressive changes, rather than advanc-
ing them.6
4.2. Islamist Women’s CSOs
Islamist women’s activism emerged with the aim of ex-
panding the secular public space for women with head-
scarves. Islamist women activists argued that the head-
scarf ban, which prohibited wearing headscarf in public
institutions, is a violation of basic rights of women, as it
hinders women’s participation in the educational, profes-
sional, and political life (Ozcetin, 2009, p. 113). To voice
their demands for participation and inclusion in the pub-
lic sphere, without being pushed back by Islamist men,
Islamist women formed their own CSOs (Aksoy, 2015,
p. 154). They contested not only the Turkish state’s un-
derstanding of secularism, which strictly controlled re-
ligion, but also the patriarchal hierarchies within the
Islamist movement (Arat, 2008; Diner & Toktaş, 2010;
Ozcetin, 2009). Their main concern was fighting against
the secularist state that discriminated against religious
women. Due to the ideological polarization in Turkey, the
Islamist women CSOs could not cooperate with other
women’s groups on gender issues until the 2000s.
4.2.1. Engendering the Democratization before 2011
With the rise of the AKP to power in 2002 and the pos-
itive atmosphere of the EU accession process, Islamist
women’s CSOs began to cooperate with some feminist
and Kurdish women’s CSOs to improve women’s rights.7
The first instance of cooperation occurred when orga-
nized Islamist women participated in the reform process
of the Penal Code.8 Islamist women’s CSOs were espe-
cially influential in lobbying AKP politicians by convey-
ing religious women’s views, who were perceived as the
party’s own clientele. In 2011, during the reform process
of the Protection Law (No 6284), Islamist women’s CSOs
consulted bureaucrats about violence against women.
In their advocacy and lobbying efforts, they employed
two strategies: 1) cooperating with state bodies respon-
sible for gender policies, and 2) networking with femi-
nist and Kurdish women’s groups. Within the framework
of the government’s first National Action Plan (2007–
2010) to combat violence against women, organized Is-
lamist women trained public officials in gender equality.
As they engaged with other women’s groups in policy-
making, they became active agents in the democratiza-
tion process under AKP rule.
4.2.2. In the Shadow of Authoritarianism after 2011
From the summer protests of 2013 onward, some Is-
lamist women activists acknowledged the fact that the
AKP ignores their demands, although both stem from
the Islamist movement. As the AKP strove to build a con-
servative society acting according to its interpretation
of religious tradition, it began to build and finance its
ownwomen’s CSOs,mostly run by the female relatives of
the AKP leadership.9 These GONGOs promote pro-family
and anti-egalitarian rhetoric (Altunok, 2016, p. 142), and
do not facilitate a gender perspective. Against this back-
ground, the coalition with other women’s CSOs became
indispensable for critical Islamist women’s groups. The
most prominent example of cooperation between Is-
lamist and secular women’s groups was during the abor-
tion debate in 2013. When organized feminists initi-
ated a petition campaign on keeping abortion legal, a
few organized Islamist women supported them. In their
public statements, these Islamist women underscored
women’s bodily rights, which include, inter alia, wear-
5 The scholarly discussion on the social media’s influence and effectiveness on social movements is a newly developing research field.
6 Personal talk, October 2016, Bremen.
7 Admittedly, the Islamist women’s CSOs I interviewed represent only one segment of organized Islamist women. Among organized Islamist women, there
are many orthodox groups that might refrain from cooperating with other women’s groups.
8 Personal interview, November 2010, Istanbul.
9 The best example is the Women and Democracy Association (KADEM). Erdoğan’s daughter is in the executive committee of the association.
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ing a headscarf, and argued that the state may not inter-
fere in women’s bodily rights. Since Islamist women suf-
fered under the secularist state’s intervention into their
physical appearance because of their headscarves, they
did not hesitate to criticize the state’s interference in
women’s bodily rights (Aksoy, 2015, p. 165). Besides the
national networking with other women’s CSOs, Islamist
women’s CSOs also expanded their networks on the in-
ternational level, especially with women’s groups from
Muslim countries. In light of rising Islamophobia, they
discuss the living conditions of Muslim women around
the world.
Lately, organized feminists complained about the si-
lence of Islamist women’s CSOs about rising authoritar-
ian politics of the AKP.10 Turam additionally argues that
Islamist women under AKP rule have not mobilized to
defend their rights (2008, p. 486). Instead of confronting
the AKP and its patriarchal approach to gender politics
together with other women’s groups, Islamist women’s
CSOs began to engage in “less political subjects” such
as women’s participation in work force. Although these
issues are quite important for achieving gender equal-
ity, organized feminists claim that they need the support
of Islamist women to resist backsliding in gender equal-
ity policies. Only one of the Islamist women’s CSOs I in-
terviewed still participate in organized women’s strug-
gles to defy AKP’s conservative discourse and policies.
The other two CSOs are co-opted by the AKP, and they
have already become instrumentalized for government
policies to protect and elevate family values, traditions,
and morality.
4.3. Kurdish Women’s CSOs
The experiences during the Kurdish-Turkish conflict and
the propinquity to the Kurdish national movement
through Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan’s (PKK) [Kurdistan
Workers Party] ethnic propaganda resulted in increased
political awareness among Kurdish women (Gökalp,
2010, p. 562). Although “Kurdishness” was the defining
element of the Kurdish women’s activism, organized Kur-
dish women raised their concerns on gender issues such
as woman’s sexuality, domestic violence, incest, rape,
and the understanding of shame and honor both in Turk-
ish and Kurdish society (cf. Diner & Toktaş, 2010). They
claimed that Turkish feminist activism ignored the ethnic-
ity dimension of women’s subordination and failed to re-
alize that Kurdish women suffer a double-discrimination,
both an ethnic- and a gender-based discrimination (Ak-
soy, 2017). To voice their ethnicity and gender-based
demands, Kurdish feminists formed their own women’s
organizations. Gökalp argues that due to the ethno-
nationalist tendencies and radical politicization among
Kurdish women, organized Kurdish women failed to gar-
ner recognition as democratic actors in Turkish public
opinion in the 1990s (2010, pp. 566–567).
4.3.1. Engendering the Democratization before 2011
In the early 2000s, Kurdish women’s CSOs could not par-
ticipate in the reform processes of the Civil and Penal
Code, as they were perceived as “separatists” by the na-
tionalist, religious, and secularist members of the Turk-
ish parliament. However, they were engaged in study-
ing the causes of violence against women, especially
“honor killings” in the Kurdish populated regions. Kur-
dish women’s CSOs pointed out prevailing state violence
in Kurds’ daily life that perpetually produced and legit-
imized a “culture of violence”. This, in turn, made domes-
tic abuse a common practice in Kurdish homes. Thanks
to their links to local municipalities under the control of
the Kurdish parties, they successfully disseminated infor-
mation on women’s legal rights both in the Kurdish and
Turkish language.With the election of Kurdish politicians
into the Turkish parliament in 2007, they became active
agents in policymaking processes. They developed the
following strategies: 1) lobbying parliamentarians for the
classification of honor killings as an “aggravated circum-
stance”, 2) informing international women’s platforms
on the laws regarding honor killings, and 3) keeping the
public’s attention within the Kurdish region on the is-
sue of violence against women. Their active engagement
together with other organized women’s groups played
a substantial role in the final revision of the Protection
Law (No 6284).
4.3.2. In the Shadow of Authoritarianism after 2011
With the authoritarian turn in Turkish politics, the AKP
began to closely monitor the activities of CSOs deemed
to be “antagonistic” to its own political vision. The gov-
ernment tightened controlling measures such as budget
auditing, fining, surveilling, or censoring materials of in-
dependent CSOs, especially the Kurdish CSOs. In some
cases, the security forces arrested, or imprisoned, ac-
tivists from Kurdish CSOs and political parties. The state
control over Kurdish civil society became even stricter
after the military coup attempt in July 2016. In its im-
mediate aftermath, the AKP declared the state of emer-
gency. The party governed the country by emergency
decrees with the “force of law”, until it has ended in
July 2018. In November 2016, the Ministry of Interior
banned 375 registered NGOs by a decree (No 677), 190
of them were Kurdish CSOs accused of having links to
the PKK and its affiliates (Cetingulec, 2016). In this wave
of closures, two Kurdish women’s organizations I inter-
viewed were shot down, and their assets were seized.
Their activists continue to call for action via social media
(Twitter, Facebook) and now work under the umbrella
of other Kurdish women’s CSOs. Under these authoritar-
ian circumstances, organized Kurdish women continue
to resist AKP’s repression and patriarchal gender poli-
tics. Like all other women’s groups, they stress the im-
portance of building large coalitions among said groups
10 Personal communication with several feminist activists, October 2016, Bremen.
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because they claim that the government can target in-
dividual actions more easily.11 Forming a large coalition,
for instance, helped to resist the aforementioned “rape
law” proposal in 2016 and improved the capacities of
organized women in pushing public institutions to en-
force laws and regulations relating domestic violence.
Despite the patriarchal governance of the AKP, the still
operating Kurdish women’s CSO I interviewed empha-
sizes on its webpage the importance of the sustainable
cooperation with public institutions in combating vio-
lence against women (KAMER, 2018). Although interac-
tion with the AKP government regarding policymaking
on gender equality issues seems highly unlikely, cooper-
ation with state actors on the local level and the lower
level of bureaucracy is a viable possibility.
4.4. Kemalist Women’s CSOs
Kemalist women—the defenders of the secularist and
nationalist ideals of the Turkish state established by
Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk)—were the first organized
women’s group in Turkey. Drawing upon the Kemalist
state feminism that made women’s equality a national
policy, they primarily focused on strengthening gender
equality in the legal framework but did not question
the underlying patriarchal mechanisms in the public and
the private sphere (Arat, 2008; Turam, 2008). Thanks to
the rise of feminist activism in the 1980s, the Kemal-
ist women’s CSOs became more engaged in combating
violence against women and pushing the governments
for further legal reforms regarding women’s rights (Mar-
shall, 2009). Despite their distant attitude toward orga-
nized Kurdish and Islamist women, they became a con-
stituent part of the women’s movement. In the 1990s,
organized Kemalist women were the only group that
closely worked with state bodies and institutions respon-
sible for women’s issues (Aksoy, 2017).
4.4.1. Engendering the Democratization before 2011
In the AKP era, Kemalist women’s CSOs, whose majority
of members are legal experts on women’s issues, primar-
ily focused on combating violence againstwomen. To this
end, they developed the following strategies: 1) launch-
ing broad-based campaigns against domestic violence
with the help of the secularist media, 2) raising pub-
lic awareness through educational activities in public
schools, and 3) lobbying parliamentarians to improve rel-
evant laws. They were remarkably influential in negotiat-
ing with governmental institutions responsible for gen-
der issues. In amending the Civil and Penal Codes and
other legal reforms, organized Kemalist women lobbied
and put pressure on policymakers sympathetic to gender
issues (Marshall, 2009).Moreover, thanks to their links in
the business world, Kemalist women’s CSOs acquired fi-
nancial or logistic support from wealthy businesswomen
for the empowerment of women in education and the
economic sector.
For a long time, Kemalist women’s CSOs were advo-
cates of the headscarf ban in public institutions. They saw
the headscarf as a political symbol of religion that had no
place in the secular public sphere in Turkey (Arat, 2008;
Turam, 2008). In 2007, they were involved in mass rallies,
protesting the AKP’s attempt to lift the headscarf ban
and the rise of Islamist politics in society and culture (Tu-
ram, 2008, p. 482). Organized Kemalist women claimed
that Islamist politics threaten the secular way of life and,
thus, women’s freedoms. However, when the AKP gov-
ernment lifted the headscarf ban in public institutions in
September 2013, there was no big reaction from Kemal-
ist women’s CSOs.
Kemalist women’s CSOs argued that women’s human
rights are enshrined in national laws, but the progress
and the enforcement are insufficient. In their public
statements on flaws in gender laws and policies, they re-
minded the AKP of Turkey’s obligation to eliminate dis-
criminatory laws, as required by the CEDAW agreement
and the Council of Europe’s Istanbul Convention. Asmen-
tioned above, legal experts from Kemalist women’s CSOs
have assisted the state body responsible for gender is-
sues (KSGM), in preparing the CEDAW country reports
that present the legal changes aimed at reducing discrim-
ination against women.
4.4.2. In the Shadow of Authoritarianism after 2011
Like all other women’s groups, Kemalist women’s CSOs
point to the increasingly authoritarian and conservative
approach of the AKP to gender issues. They also began to
employ defensive strategies to resist backsliding in gen-
der policies. Since the restructuring and renaming of the
“Ministry of Women and Family” to “Ministry of Family
and Social Policies” in December 2011, organized Kemal-
ist women stress that the omission of the word “women”
from the ministry’s name means that women are not re-
garded as individuals, but only as “members of family”.
They have since been demanding a change in the name
of the ministry. However, Erdoğan rejected this demand
and stated: “We are a conservative party. For us, what is
important is the family” (Belge, 2011). Organized Kemal-
ist women have also been highly vocal on the low levels
of women’s participation in politics. Together with some
feminist and Kurdish women’s CSOs, they have been call-
ing for the introduction of a minimum 30 percent gender
quota system.12 However, the AKP vehemently rejects
this idea. Also, Kemalist women’s CSOs have addressed
the low levels of women’s participation in work force.
They demand the introduction of institutional measures
such as providing public childcare and elderly care ser-
vices and guaranteeing equal opportunities in hiring pro-
cesses. The AKP, however, introduced a new law to ex-
tend the paid maternity leave up to six months. The new
11 Personal communication, October 2016, Bremen.
12 Personal interview, November 2010, Istanbul.
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law additionally increased maternity allowance for each
successive child, as a part of the AKP’s pro-family poli-
cies (Kandiyoti, 2016, p. 113). Instead of establishing pub-
lic child-care services, the government prefers to leave
child-care issue to the private sector, which leads to dis-
crimination against women from lower classes.
To resist the AKP’s conservative gender discourse and
politics, Kemalist women’s CSOs stress the importance
of the women’s platforms to include various women’s
groups in processes of lobbying policymakers and nego-
tiating with state institutions. They continue to use their
links within the secularist media and in women’s inter-
national networks. Yet, organized Kemalist women ac-
knowledge that the religious-conservative political dis-
course of the AKP leadership and hostility towards orga-
nized women’s demands make the struggle for gender
equality increasingly difficult.
5. Conclusions
The gender and transition literature concentrated on
one variant of the democratization process, namely tran-
sition to a full democracy, but failed to acknowledge
and analyze the possibility of democratic reversal and
the ensuing backsliding in gender politics. While gender
and politics scholars newly began to analyze anti-gender
movements and investigate dismantling of gender equal-
ity regimes in the context of de-democratization in West-
ern democracies, I suggest that we need to look at em-
pirical cases where anti-feminist actors have always con-
tested gender equality andwhere the democratic pendu-
lum has always been swinging between democratization
and democratic reversal. In this regard, Turkey is a com-
pelling case.
After a decade of democratic progress, Turkey now
experiences democratic reversal, even an authoritar-
ian revival, under AKP rule. Against this background,
the AKP employs an ultra-conservative gender discourse
and introduces pro-natalist and pro-family policies to
cement ideals of traditional family roles (Acar & Al-
tunok, 2013; Kandiyoti, 2016). To this end, the AKP
government, like any other government in authoritar-
ian regimes, supports and finances pro-government
women’s organizations—under the guise of participa-
tory democratic governance—and sidelines autonomous
women’s CSOs from policymaking processes (Kandiyoti,
2015). As this article showed, despite the authoritar-
ian drift and anti-feminist discourse of the AKP, the au-
tonomous women’s CSOs have found alternative ways
to mobilize and to resist AKP’s conservative gender poli-
tics.While they employed pro-active strategies to initiate
gender policy changes in democratization process before
2011, a shift to defensive strategies in the shadow of au-
thoritarianism after 2011 has clearly occurred.
Similar to oppositional women’s organizing in author-
itarian regimes in Latin America and Eastern Europe (see
Waylen, 2007), diverse groups of organized women in
Turkey act as part of the broader opposition and in re-
sponse to increasing repression under the AKP. Relying
upon their long-years of experience in advocacy, lobby-
ing, andmonitoring, they employ three strategies to deal
with the democratic reversal and backsliding in gender
politics under AKP rule. First, organized women prefer
to coalesce on the loosely organized large women’s plat-
forms, bringing a high number of CSOs from different
groups together, to resist the AKP’s gender-insensitive
law proposals, as was the case in the “abortion” or “rape
law” debate. The large women’s platforms are more
likely to capture and keep the public’s attention and
thereby to successfully apply pressure on policymakers
to take necessary steps to stop the government introduc-
ing regressive gender policies. In contrast to pre-2011,
these women’s platforms are not issue-based and short-
lived, rather they are utilized as a long-term strategy.
These large platforms can, however, only prevail when
organized women overcome the dominating ideological
differentiations between themselves (Kurdish vs. Turk-
ish; Islamist vs. Kemalist), which hampered their effi-
ciency and influence until recently (Aksoy, 2017; Arat,
2008; Diner & Toktaş, 2010; Kandiyoti, 2016). Second,
the women’s CSOs reach out to international women’s
networks (UN Women, CEDAW Committee) not only to
acquire support for their gendered demands, but also to
communicate with the AKP on equal terms. Since there
is little or no dialogue between the AKP government and
autonomous women’s CSOs, they use the international
platforms as a tool for communicating with the govern-
ment. Third, all women’s groups heavily use social media
in attracting public attention to their gendered concerns.
Social media has more potential to disturb the author-
ity and is faster than print media in spreading the word.
Thanks to combining the bottom-up and external pres-
sure, women’s rights groups succeed to respond to AKP’s
patriarchal backlash. While feminist, Kurdish, and Kemal-
ist women’s CSOs employ these strategies to oppose the
patriarchal attacks, Islamist women’s CSOs, as I observed,
lost their visibility in the gendered struggle against AKP’s
authoritarianism, which needs a further analysis.
Drawing on my findings, the article maintains that
the role of women CSOs is highly important to prevent
regressive gender policies and to protect women’s rights
in the context of democratic reversal and authoritarian
regimes. Women in formal political institutions can eas-
ily be sidelined and gender equality mechanisms be chal-
lenged by anti-democratic rulers. But thanks to their flex-
ibility, women organized in the informal arena can find
much faster alternative ways to circumvent the author-
ity. The article argues that to more successfully prevent
backsliding in gender politics, women’s CSOs need to pur-
sue three strategies: 1) create strong bottom-uppressure
by using street protests and social media, 2) build large,
heterogeneous (intersectional) and sustainablewomen’s
platforms to press gender-based demands, and 3) in-
teract with state actors and the formal political arena.
These strategies will help organized women to develop
solutions to counteract anti-feminist sentiments and pol-
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itics in de-democratizing and authoritarian regimes on a
global level. Sustainability and vigilance are the key terms
for organized women in defying the patriarchy.
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